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This study analyzes the impact of government efforts to increase agricultural incomes on 
income  inequality  in  rural  China.    It  collects  and  analyzes  survey  data  from  473 
households  in  Yunnan,  China  in  2004.    In  particular,  it  investigates  the  effects  of 
government efforts to promote improved upland rice technologies.  Our analysis shows 
that  farmers  who  adopted  these  technologies  had  incomes  approximately  32  percent 
higher than non-adopters.  While much of this came from increased incomes from the 
selling of upland rice, adopters also enjoyed higher incomes from other cash crops.  We 
attribute this to technology spillovers.  Despite substantial increases associated with the 
adoption of improved upland rice technologies, we estimate that the impact on income 
inequality was relatively slight.  This is primarily due to the fact that low income farmers 
had relatively high rates of technology adoption.   
 
 
JEL Categories:  O13, O18, O53, Q12 
 
Keywords:  Rural economic development, Chinese economic development, upland rice, 
rural-urban income inequality, agricultural income policy.   1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Over  the  last  several  decades,  China  has  made  unparalleled  progress  in  increasing 
incomes and reducing poverty.  Government policy, and changes in government policy, 
can rightly be credited with much of this progress.  One undesirable consequence of this 
progress has been the widening income gap between rural and urban areas.  The current 
rural-urban income gap is the result of a long-term trend that began in 1978 with the 
economic reforms of Deng Xiaoping.  In 1978, rural incomes were approximately 39 
percent of urban incomes.  By 2010, they had fallen to 30 percent (NBS, 2009).  This has 
occurred despite a massive reallocation of labor from rural to urban areas.  Over the same 
period, the share of China’s total population living in rural areas fell from 82 percent to 
approximately 50 percent (NBS, 2009). 
  Chinese policy-makers are keenly aware of the political ramifications associated 
with the widening gap between rich and poor (e.g., Jiang, 1997).
1  This has resulted in a 
proliferation of policy initiatives ( e.g.,  CPAD  [1994]  initiated  China's 8-7 National 
Poverty  Reduction  Prog ram;  CPG  [2001]  launched  the  West  Areas  Development 
Strategy).  A major thrust of these initiatives has been the effort to increase rural incomes 
via state support of agriculture.  This is evidenced by the large increases in the national 
government’s  agricultural  budget  that  have  occurred  in  recent  years.  For  example, 
national budget spending on agriculture increased in real terms from 25 billion RMB 
Yuan in 1990, to 81 billion RMB Yuan in 2000, and to 533 billion RMB Yuan in 2009 
(MOF, 2009).
2  
                                                 
1 For example, see http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/6911854.html . 
2 Expenditures are in 1990 constant Yuan.   2 
  One  key  component  of  the  government’s  agricultural  policy  has  been  the 
encouragement of productivity improvements via local extension services in rural areas.
3 
A potential problem with these efforts is that they may increase local income inequality.  
Indeed, a large li terature,  stimulated  by  interest  in  the  consequences  of  the  “green 
revolution,” reports that agricultural technology adoptions can sometimes worsen income 
inequality (Griffin, 1974; Pearse, 1980, Lipton and Longhurst, 1989; Freebairn, 1995).  
This occurs when the households that adopt new technologies are those that are better off 
to begin with.   
  A  substantial  literature  exists  on  income  inequality  in  rural  China  (Chen  and 
Zhang, 2009).  Benjamin, Brandt, and Giles (2005) report that most rural inequality is 
due  to  local  (within  village)  differences  rather  than  differences  across  villages  or 
provinces.  While studies reach different conclusions as to the source of local income 
disparities, Ravallion and Chen (1999) conclude that when it comes to  farm income, 
grain production is a -- if not the -- major contributing factor.   
  Given this interest in rural income inequality, it is perhaps surprising that little is 
known about the distributional impacts of government-aided productivity improvements 
in Chinese farming communities.  We are aware of only one study that directly addresses 
the impact of improved agricultural technology.  Lin (1999) investigated the effects of F1 
hybrid rice adoption.  He used data from a cross-sectional survey of 500 households in 5 
                                                 
3 The Chinese government re-established its public agricultural extension service in the late 1970s. By the 
middle of the 1980s, China had established public agricultural extension service stations in every county 
and township, including remote regions.  The system provided high-quality agricultural extension service. 
By the middle of the 1990s, it employed an extension staff of more than one million, approximately 70% of 
whom had graduated from technical high schools or colleges. More than 90% of these worked at public 
agricultural extension system stations at the county and township levels (Lu, 1999; Hu, et al, 2009).  Based 
upon  a  survey  of  28  counties  in  rural  China,  Hu  et  al  (2004)  reports  that  40%  of  new  agricultural 
technologies adopted by farmers during 1996 and 2002 were generated from public agricultural extension 
services.   3 
counties of Hunan Province taken in December 1988 and January 1989.  While he did not 
come to a definitive conclusion regarding income inequality, Lin found that adopters saw 
their rice incomes increase; and non-adopters saw their non-rice, agricultural incomes 
increase.  The latter mitigated the income inequality effects of the former.   
  Gustafsson and Li’s (2002) finding of substantial heterogeneity in income growth 
rates across counties in rural China is a reminder that one-size-fits-all generalizations 
should  be  viewed  with  caution.    There  is  therefore  a  need  for  additional  studies  to 
confirm or disconfirm the findings of Lin’s (1999) research.  This study meets that need 
by analyzing the income effects of technology adoptions associated with the introduction 
of  an  improved  upland  rice  variety.    We  draw  on  a  cross-sectional  survey  of  rural 
households in Yunnan province conducted in 2005.  While our study differs from Lin in 
some important respects, it reaches a similar conclusion.  We find no evidence that the 
adoption of improved upland rice contributes to increased income inequality.   
  Our study proceeds as follows.   Section  II presents a theoretical  analysis that 
shows  how  the  predictions  of  previous  analyses  require  revision  when  there  are 
technology spillovers.  Section III presents some background concerning the technology 
adoption studied here.  Section  IV discusses the data used in our empirical analyses.  
Section V reports the results of our investigations.  Section VI concludes. 
 
II.  THEORY AND METHODOLOGY 
 
  Theory.  Our model generalizes Lin’s (1999) theoretical framework.  Like Lin, we 
work within a two-good, two-household general equilibrium model where comparative 
advantage is driven by access to different input endowments of the households as well as 
different input requirements of the two goods. The two goods produced are rice (R) and   4 
non-rice (N). Rice is assumed to be land-intensive and non-rice is labor-intensive. The 
two households are indexed by  i={1,2},  and possess endowments  Ei. The  production 
possibilities frontier of non-rice for household i is defined as: 
  ( , ) Ni i Ri i y F y E . 
We assume that household 1 is land-abundant, that is it has an endowment vector E1 that 
gives  it  comparative  advantage  in  rice.  We  maintain  Lin’s  assumption  of  no  factor 
markets  but  perfect  product  markets,  so  that  all  transactions  take  place  through  the 
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The equilibrium relative price of  rice pR/pN is such that the excess supply of rice of 
household  1  exactly  equals  the  excess  demand  of  rice  of  household  2,  and, 
simultaneously, such that the excess demand of non-rice of household 1 exactly equals 
household 2’s excess supply of non-rice.  
  FIGURE  1  illustrates  the  equilibrium  before  the  technology  shock.  We  have 
assumed  for  expositional  purposes  that  the  preferences  of  the  two  households  are 
identical, but that their PPFs differ due to the differences in their factor endowments. 
Household 1’s PPF is biased towards rice and household 2’s PPF is biased towards non-
rice. The market-clearing relative price of rice results in household 1 producing more rice   5 
and less non-rice than household 2 (y1R > y2R and y1N < y2N).  Therefore, household 1 sells 
rice to household 2 in exchange of non-rice.
4 
  FIGURE 2 demonstrates the essence of Lin’s (1999) hypothesis. The prediction of 
Lin is that a technology shock for rice production will bias the PPF of a technology 
adopter towards rice. In particular, he assumes that the household that has comparative 
advantage in rice will also have a comparative advantage in technology adoption and 
therefore becomes the technology adopter. If the relative price of rice remains unchanged, 
the adopters find it in their best interest to produce more rice and less non-rice than 
before the technology adoption change. This implies that the total output of rice goes up 
creating an excess supply of rice causing the relative price of rice to fall.   
  This reduction in the relative price of rice will induce both the technology adopter 
and the non-adopter to produce more non-rice output and less rice. Overall, therefore, 
adopters will produce more rice than before (y1R’ > y1R), but the change in non-rice will 
be ambiguous.  Non-adopters will produce less rice (y2R’ < y2R) and unambiguously more 
non-rice  (y2N’  >  y2N)  than  before.  The  incomes  of  both  households  increase 
unambiguously. Comparing the outputs of the two households, as long as both y1R > y2R 
and  y1N  <  y2N  prior  to  the  technology  adoption,  it  must  be  that  technology  adopters 
produce more rice and less non-rice than non-adopters (y1R’ > y2R’ and y1N’ < y2N’).  
  Lin  (1999)  confirms  this  prediction  using  a  micro-dataset  of  rural  Chinese 
farmers.  He concludes that the output adjustment of non-adopters towards non-rice -- the 
                                                 
4 Notice that for this result to be true, household 1 must not have access to more of both land and labor than 
household 2, as it could produce more of both goods simply by having superior endowment vector than 
household 2. 
   6 
relative  price  of  which  has  increased  --  mitigates  the  local  income  inequality 
consequences of the new rice technology. 
  Our analysis generalizes Lin (1999) in that we allow the technology shock to have 
a spill-over effect in the production of non-rice.
5 As we discuss below, this possibility 
seems reasonable in the context of the particular technology shock that we analyze.  As a 
result of this generalization,  an adopter of the new technology will not only expand its 
production possibilities frontier in the direction of rice, but also in the direction of non-
rice. FIGURE 3 demonstrates such a technology shock, adopted by household 1.    
  After the technology adoption, household 1 will not only produce more rice than 
before but also, given a sufficiently large spill -over effect, more non-rice than before 
(y1R’ > y1R and y1N’ > y1N).  If household 1 produces more of both goods, it is no longer 
necessary for the relative price of rice to fall to clear the market. Furthermore, if the 
relative price of rice falls, the drop is smaller than it would have been in the absence of 
the technology spill-over.  
  FIGURE 3 is constructed such that the technology adoption has a negligible effect 
on the relative price of rice because the increase in supply of the two goods is exactly 
proportional to the relative demand of the two goods. If the technology change does not 
result in a reduction in the relative price of rice, the non-adopter will not change its 
output  mix  and therefore  will  not  experience  an  increase  in  income.  The  technology 
adopter will have an unambiguous increase in income. If the spill-over effect is large 
                                                 
5 We give more detail below about the nature of the technology shock.   7 
enough, we can get a result that the adopter will produce not only more rice but also more 
non-rice than the non-adopter (y1R’ > y2R’ and y1N’ > y2N’).
6 
  If the output adjustment is as we describe and the relative price of rice does not 
change after technology adoption, the income of the non-adopter will not change while 
the income of the adopter will increase. We therefore conclude that the technology shock 
could have a worse outcome for income inequality than that predicted by Lin if the 
technology shock has a spill-over effect to non-rice. 
  Methodology.  In light of the theory above, our study adopts a two-step procedure 
to estimate the effect of technology adoption on income inequality.  First, we use 
conventional regression analysis to estimate the determinants   of individual  farmers’ 
incomes,  including  the  effect  of  technology  adoption  on  the  different  components  of 
farmers’  incomes.  We  then  use  the  estimated  equation(s)  to  simulate  what  farmers’ 
incomes would be in the absence of technology adoption.  These are used to calculate 
Gini coefficients for the two scenarios of (i) technology adoption and (ii) no technology 
adoption.  In this way we determine whether government efforts to increase rural incomes 
via support of upland rice production result in greater or lesser income inequality. 
 
III.  BACKGROUND 
 
This study analyzes recent government efforts to improve upland rice productivity in 
Yunnan Province, China.  Yunnan Province is located in southwestern China, bordering 
Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar.  It is one of the poorest provinces in China.  10.6 percent 
of those living in poverty in China reside in Yunnan, despite the fact that the province 
                                                 
6 Notice that adopters produce more non-rice than non-adopters only if the productivity improvement of 
rice is large enough, the spill-over to non-rice productivity of adopters is large enough, and the non-adopter 
is not too much better than the adopter in producing non-rice prior to the technology adoption.   8 
comprises less than 4 percent of the total population.  A relatively large share of the 
population (about a third) consists of ethnic minorities.  Approximately 94 percent of the 
land area is categorized as mountainous.  Agriculture is a major source of income, but 
cultivatable land is scarce.  Planting is restricted to upland plains and sloped hillsides.  
Slash and burn practices are quite common, and terracing is still relatively rare in remote 
areas.  Level land is extremely scarce.  Only about 5 percent of the land is cultivated. 
  Income security in the remote, mountainous areas of Yunnan is a concern for both 
the national and provincial governments.  Because of the relative isolation of villages, it 
is imperative that local farmers have sufficient resources to support themselves.  Even if 
sufficient food is available outside the region, it may be difficult to transport to these 
areas. 
  While some farmers raise maize as a staple food, rice is generally preferred.
7  
Unfortunately, traditional varieties of rice are generally low-yielding on the upland slopes 
of Yunnan; and paddy rice is  usually infeasible due to a lack of water.  To address this 
problem, rice scientists/breeders at Yunnan Academy of Agricultural Sciences (YAAS) 
have  developed  alternative  upland  rice  hybrids.    This  effort  has  recently  been 
complemented by local agricultural extension services, which promote the hybrid upland 
rice.  Because these hybrids have greater growing requirements than traditional varieties, 
they require farmers to use  chemical fertilizers, and are best used in terraced planting 
environments.    The  local  government  provide s  subsidies  for  both  the  purchase  of 
fertilizer and the building of terraces. 
                                                 
7 Maize  and  traditional  upland  rice  with  very  low  yield  served  as  staple  foods  in  the  study  areas  for 
hundreds of years. Improved upland rice technology introduction is seen by farmers as key for their staple 
food transfer from maize.   9 
  Most upland rice is grown for self-consumption.  Increased productivity in the 
growing of upland rice is seen as key for establishing income security.  By increasing the 
output associated with upland rice production, farmers can free up scarce cultivatable 
land resources for the production of cash crops.  This translates directly into increased 
incomes. 
 
IV.  DATA 
 
The data for this study  comes from individual household surveys.  Preliminary work 
began in 2004 when a team composed of a rice breeder from YAAS and rice economists 
from Zhongnan University of Economics and Law (ZUEL) and the International Rice 
Research Institute (IRRI) designed the survey, visited the area, and directed a pilot survey.  
A geographical cluster sampling procedure was used for the main survey, with selected 
households chosen from villages in seven counties in southeast, south, and southwest 
Yunnan.  In 2005, teams from ZUEL and IRRI visited the area and trained local staff 
from the county/township Agricultural Technology Extension Stations (ATES) in how to 
administer the survey.  These teams then travelled to the respective villages, surveying 
households door-to-door.  Most surveys were conducted with the household head.  A 
total of 473 usable surveys were produced.   
  As  discussed  above,  Yunnan’s  terrain  is  generally  mountainous,  and  most 
cultivated land takes place at elevated altitudes.  The seven counties in this study range in 
altitude  from  700  to  1900  meters.    Altitude  is  important  in  upland  rice  production.  
According to experiments from YAAS, upland rice has greatest adaptability at altitudes 
below 1400 meters.  As upland rice is a staple crop, this physiological fact is an important 
determinant  of farming  activity.  TABLE 1 reports  sample characteristics of the 473   10 
households in our sample, categorized by low (1400 meters or less) and high (greater 
than 1400 meters) altitude. 
  Average  household  size  for  the  overall  sample  is  4.7  persons.    There  are 
approximately 2.5 working members per household, with little difference between low 
and high altitude households.  There exist, however, substantial differences in the amount 
of  cultivated  farmland.    On  average,  high  altitude  farmers  cultivate  approximately  a 
hectare and a quarter of land.  Low altitude farmers cultivate a full hectare more.  Low 
altitude farmers also earn considerably more than high altitude farmers.  Average income 
for low altitude farmers is 16,763 RMB Yuan, approximately 80 percent higher than the 
annual income of high altitude farmers.
8  There are also substantial differences between 
the amount of income derived from planting and livestock.  Low altitude farmers derive 
greater income from planting, whereas high altitude farmers derive the majority of their 
income from livestock.   
  While upland rice is grown primarily for self -consumption, both sets of farmers 
earn approximately a quarter of their planting income from the sale of upland rice.   For 
both low and high altitude farmers, a much higher percent of incom e is earned from 
planting, and much smaller percentage of income is earned from non-farm activities, than 
is typical for rural Chinese farming households (Benjamin, Brandt, Giles, and Wang, 
2007).  High altitude farmers have slightly less terraced land, and slightly more irrigated 
land.  Finally, the uptake of improved upland rice technology is approximately 50 percent 
greater amongst low altitude farmers (65.7 percent versus 42.0 percent).   Technology 
                                                 
8   As  discussed  in  Chen  and  Zhang  (2009),  there are  a  number  of  difficult  issues  in  calculating  rural 
households’ total incomes.  Major issues include the valuation of production used for own consumption, 
and imputed rental income from own-housing.  Our income values do not reflect these sources of income.  
While this is a deficiency of the current study, it does facilitate direct comparison with Lin (1999) who also 
omitted these sources of income.   11 
adopters  are  defined  as  using  a  combination  of  improved  upland  rice  varieties  with 
terracing and/or chemical fertilizers. 
  TABLE  2  reports  farmers’  income  inequality,  as  measured  by  the  Gini 
coefficient, for the seven different counties in our sample.  It is apparent that income 
inequality differs substantially across counties.  This is a function of a number of factors, 
including  different  degrees  of  income  inequality  by  income  category,  and  different 
degrees of reliance upon the four categories of income.     
 
V.  RESULTS 
 
Evidence  of  a  price  effect  on  land  use.    Government  efforts  to  improve  upland  rice 
productivity can affect income inequality through a variety of channels, both direct and 
indirect.  Ceteris paribus, increased rice productivity increases rice production, generating 
greater income from rice planting for those who adopt the technology.  Whether this 
increases income inequality depends  on whether the adopting farmers have relatively 
high or low incomes.  In addition, Huang and Qian (2003), point out that there may also 
be a compensating price effect.  The greater supply of rice will result in a lowered price.  
This serves to counter the income gains from adopters.   
  As discussed above, Lin (1999) notes that the lower price of rice also encourages 
shifting  of  cultivatable  land  to  other  cash  crops.  TABLE  3  presents  evidence  that  a 
similar market response may be at work in Yunnan.  Over the period 2000 to 2004, the 
percent of cultivatable land devoted to upland rice production fell for both adopting and 
non-adopting  farmers.
9   The fact that the redu ction is lower for adopting farmers is 
                                                 
9 Data on land use in previous years was collected via questions on the 2005 survey that retrospectively 
queried households about past farming practices.   12 
consistent  with  a  higher  marginal  product  of  land  in  rice  production  mitigating  the 
incentive to shift out of rice production. 
  OLS estimation of the income equations.  The first step in our two-step procedure 
consists of estimating farmers’ incomes.  We want to identify the effect of technology 
adoption, while controlling for important other variables.  Accordingly, we estimate the 
following specification relating farmers’ incomes to household characteristics: 
 
0 1 i 2 3 i 4 i i
5 i 6 i 7 i 8 i
7
c
9 i 9+c i i
c=1
ln Income =α + α Land  + α Labor + α Age+ α Education
                      + α HHSize  + α Terrace  + α Low Altitude  + α Market
                      + α Adoption  +  α D  + ε
 
where Land measures farm size (in hectares), Labor the number of working household 
members, Age and Education are the age and maximum educational attainment of the 
household head, HHSize the number of persons in the household,  Terrace the percentage 
of terraced land, Low Altitude is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the farm is 
situated at an altitude of 1400 meters or lower, Market is the distance in kilometers of the 
household to the nearest market, Adoption is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
the household is an adopter of improved upland rice technology, and 
c D  is a county 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the c
th county.   
  Land,  Labor,  Age,  and  Education  can  be  thought  of  as  inputs  into  the  farm 
production function, so that their increase is expected to result in greater output.  HHSize, 
holding constant Labor, is included to pick up opportunities for household production 
specialization that allows farm laborers to produce more agricultural output.  With Land 
held constant, the variables Terrace and Low Altitude proxy for the quality of the land 
input.  Market measures the cost of transporting goods to market, with greater distance   13 
expected to lower income.  Adoption is expected to increase planting income from upland 
rice, and possibly other outputs depending on the degree of technology spillover.  The 
county dummies pick up unmeasured characteristics of the quality of agricultural inputs, 
the effects of which are a priori ambiguous. 
  TABLE 4 summarizes the results of regressing farmers’ incomes on the variables 
above -- first with respect to total income, then with respect to the individual components 
of farmers’ incomes.    Column (1) reports the effect  on technology  adoption on total 
income.  All  of the coefficients  have the  expected signs,  though not  all  of them are 
statistically significant.  The coefficient on the technology adoption is significant and 
large in size.  Technology adopters are estimated to enjoy 32 percent higher incomes, 
ceteris paribus.   
  It is also useful to look at the effect of adoption on the different components of 
income  (cf.  Columns  2  through  5).    Here  again,  most  of  the  coefficients  have  the 
expected signs, though there are some interesting differences across the different income 
components.  For example, education does not produce much of a return for planting 
income  associated  with  upland  rice,  but  is  a  positive  and  significant  determinant  of 
livestock, non-farm, and (marginally) planting income from other crops.  Unlike upland 
rice  production,  these  activities  are  primarily  engaged  in  for  the  purpose  of  market 
exchange.  Education may pay off here because of its value in determining (and learning) 
the most profitable market activities for the household.   
  Not  surprisingly,  land  is  an  important  determinant  for  planting  and  livestock 
income,  but  not  for  non-farm  income.    Interestingly,  terracing,  which  was  primarily   14 
promoted as a means of gaining greater yields from the improved upland rice varieties, 
appears to have its most significant effect in planting income from other crops. 
  Most interesting is the adoption variable.  We expect the coefficient for Adoption 
to be positive and significant in Column (2), and it is.  The associated coefficient implies 
that households that adopt improved upland rice technology have incomes from selling 
upland rice that are approximately 45 percent larger than non-adopters, ceteris paribus.  
But the Adoption coefficient on planting income from other crops is also positive and 
significant.  This is the opposite of what Lin (1999) predicts. 
  Our explanation relates to the theory we presented above.  Unlike Lin’s study, 
technology adoption in our study includes not just the use of the improved upland rice 
hybrid, but also employment of the other bundled services provided by the Agricultural 
Technology Extension Stations (ATES).  These include the use of fertilizer and support 
in terrace building.  The latter two services are easily transferred to cash crops, where 
they are also expected to increase output.  Thus the positive and significant (at the 10-
percent,  two-tailed  level)  of  the  Adoption  coefficient  in  Column  (3)  of  TABLE  4  is 
evidence of a technology spillover. 
  Not only do we not see evidence of a negative Adoption coefficient for the two 
components  of planting income, but  neither do we see it for livestock and non-farm 
income.  Here the explanation of a direct technology spillover is less tenable.  More 
likely, technology adoption allows some farmers to reduce their labor input into planting 
for  self-consumption.
10   This  frees  up  resources  for  non -planting  income,  such  as 
                                                 
10 Subramanian and Qaim (2009) find evidence of a similar labor-saving effect from the introduction of Bt 
cotton in India.   15 
livestock and non-farm production.  The effect is likely not large, but large enough to 
compensate for the negative price effect predicted by Lin (1999).   
  Addressing endogeneity.  One concern with the previous analysis is that it ignores 
the  possibility  that  technology  adoption  may  be  correlated  with  other  productive 
characteristics.  The associated positive Adoption coefficients may be proxying for these 
characteristics, rather than picking up a productivity effect from improved technology.  
Fortunately, we have a variable that is a good candidate for an instrumental variable. 
  An important determinant of whether a household is a technology adopter is that 
there exists an extension program supported by the Agricultural Technology Extension 
Station (ATES) in the village.  Approximately 80 percent of the farmers in our sample 
live in villages with an ATES-supported extension program (cf. Appendix).  The program 
supplies  both  advice  through  an  extension  agent,  and  direct  inputs  in  the  form  of 
chemical fertilizers.  Only farmers in the village can avail themselves of the program.  
Therefore, the presence of a program in a village is highly correlated with the decision to 
adopt the improved upland rice technology.   
  We also expect that the presence of a program in a village will be uncorrelated 
with farmers’ incomes in that village.  While the decision to start a program is no doubt 
partly  a  function  of  the  size  of  a  village
11, which is likely positively related to the 
productivity of farmers’ lands, this is balanced by the desire to locate program in low-
income areas where agricultural productivity is relatively low.   
  TABLE 5 reports the results of re-estimating the preceding regression equations 
using  2SLS.    Column  (1)  reports  the  results  of  the  first-stage  regression,  where  the 
variable  Adoption  is  now  the  dependent  variable.    The  specification  includes  all  the 
                                                 
11  This is because more people can benefit from a program if a village is relatively large.   16 
variables of TABLE 4, except that the endogenous variable Adoption is replaced with an 
Extension  dummy  variable,  indicating  the  presence  of  an  extension  program  in  the 
village.   
  The coefficients are somewhat difficult to interpret.  For example, we know from 
TABLE 1 that farmers in low altitude areas are approximately 50 percent more likely to 
adopt  upland  rice  technology.    Yet  the  coefficient  for  Low  Altitude  is  negative  and 
significant.    This  results  from  including  county  dummies  in  the  specification.  
Nevertheless,  it  is  clear  that  the  presence  of  a  program  is  a  positive  and  significant 
determinant  of  Adoption,  as  indicated  by  the  coefficient  for  the  Extension  variable.  
Further, the associated t statistic of 4.24 more than satisfies the Staiger-Stock (1997) rule-
of-thumb for avoiding “weak instruments.”
12  
  The second column of TABLE 5 reports the 2SLS analog of the OLS coefficients 
in  Column  (1)  of  TABLE  4.    While  a  Hausman  endogeneity  test  rejects  the  null 
hypothesis  of  exogeneity  (or  equal  coefficients)  at  the  5  percent  level,  the  2SLS 
coefficients are relatively close to their OLS counterparts.  In particular, the estimated 
coefficient of the Adoption variable using 2SLS is 0.2987, compared to an OLS estimate 
of 0.2786.  Both are significant at the 1 percent level.   
  The subsequent analysis uses both the OLS and 2SLS estimates to calculate the 
impact of technology adoption on income inequality.  These will produce very similar 
results, though for a number of reasons, we prefer the OLS estimates.
13 
                                                 
12  Staiger and Stock recommend a partial F-statistic of 10 or larger.  See also Stock and Yogo (2005). 
13 One reason we prefer the OLS estimates is that the expected endogeneity bias is p ositive.  Thus, 
correcting for endogeneity should produce coefficients that are less positive.  In fact, the  Adoption 
coefficients in Columns (2) through (4) of TABLE 5 are larger than their TABLE 4 analogs.  A further 
reason to prefer the OLS estimates is that the size of the Adoption coefficients in Columns (3) and (4) strain 
incredulity.  Nevertheless, these issues matter little for the conclusions of our study.   17 
  Estimating the effect of technology adoption on income inequality.  We are now 
in a position to estimate the effect of technology adoption on farmers’ income inequality 
in Yunnan Province.  We start with the OLS regressions of TABLE 4.  We use the 
estimated regression coefficients from Column (1) of TABLE 4 to predict income for 
each of the 452 farmers in  that sample.  The associated predicted incomes represent 
farmers’ incomes in an environment where technology adoption is available to all, but 
only some choose to adopt.   
  We then assign a value of zero for Adoption to all the farmers in this sample and 
recalculate  their  predicted  incomes,  using  the  same  coefficients  from  Column  (1)  of 
TABLE  4.    These  incomes  represent  farmers’  incomes  in  an  environment  where 
technology adoption is not available to any farmers.  The two sets of predicted incomes 
are then used to calculate Gini coefficients for the samples “with technology adoption” 
and “without technology adoption” respectively.  We also use the 2SLS coefficients of 
Column (2) of TABLE 5 to obtain alternative predictions of farmers’ incomes.  This 
provides us an alternative set of predictions for calculating the Gini coefficient for the 
environment “with technology adoption.” 
  These  calculations  are  reported  in  TABLE  6.    The  top  row  reports  the  Gini 
coefficients  using  predictions  for  “Total  Income.”    For  an  environment  without 
technology adoption, we calculate a Gini coefficient of 0.285.  This rises slightly to 0.288 
and 0.291 when technology adoption is possible, depending on whether we are using the 
OLS or 2SLS estimates to predict farmers’ incomes.  In any case, the differences are 
negligible, at least compared to the cross-county Gini coefficients reported in TABLE 2.   18 
  When we redo the exercise for the income subcomponents (cf. Rows 2 though 5 
of TABLE 6), we see some evidence of greater income inequality for the individual 
components of income, but not enough to change our overall conclusion.  Despite the 
relatively  large  estimated  impacts  of  technology  income,  as  given  by  the  regression 
equations of TABLES 4 and 5, there is little evidence that this contributes to greater 
income inequality for the farmers of Yunnan Province. 
  The apparent contradiction of large technology impacts in TABLES 4 and 5, and 
relatively small income inequality effects in TABLE 6, is resolved by FIGURE 4.  This 
figure  graphs  the  rate  of  technology  adoption  by  (pre-technology  adoption)  income 
deciles.
14  Evident is the high rates of technology adoption among lower income deciles.  
While the relationship between technology adoption and i ncome is non-monotonic, it is 
clear that lower-income farmers adopt technology at rates that are roughly equivalent to 
those  of  higher -income  farmers.    Thus,  the  benefits  of  technology  adoption  flow 
relatively evenly across the income distribution of rural farmers in our dataset.  
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
This study uses household income data from farmers in rural China to evaluate the effect 
of  government  promotion  of  improved  agricultural  technology  on  income  inequality.  
Income inequality is a serious concern in China, where the rural-urban income gap has 
been  growing  wider  in  recent  years.    As  a  result,  both  national  and  provincial 
governments  have  taken  numerous  steps  to  increase  agricultural  incomes.    A  key 
component  of  these  is  government  efforts  to  increase  productivity  via  Agricultural 
                                                 
14 As the data is cross-sectional, we do not have pre-technology adoption incomes for adopters.  Instead, we 
use  predicted  incomes  for  all  households  assuming  no  technology  adoption  as  our  measure  of  pre-
technology adoption income.   19 
Technology Extension Stations (ATES).  These have been widely used to promote new 
technologies among rural farmers.  A concern is that government efforts may induce 
greater local income inequalities if the benefits of government support flow to those who 
are relatively well-off. 
  We  look  at  one  such  effort  in  Yunnan  Province.    Here,  rice  breeders  have 
developed  a  new  upland  rice  hybrid.    In  combination  with  chemical  fertilizers  and 
terracing, these improved upland rice varieties offer substantial productivity gains over 
traditional upland rice varieties.  Village-based technology extension program have been 
instrumental in encouraging the uptake of this improved technology.  Our study compares 
adopters with non-adopters to estimate the income effects of technology adoption, along 
with the corresponding impact on income inequality. 
  Approximately half of the 473 households in our survey adopted the improved 
upland rice technology.  We estimate that incomes were approximately 32 percent higher 
for adopters.  Furthermore, we find that adopters experienced not only higher incomes 
from planting upland rice, but also from planting other cash crops.  The latter result is 
contrary to the finding of Lin (1999).  We attribute this difference to the fact that the 
adoption  of  improved  upland  rice  technology,  which  includes  the  use  of  chemical 
fertilizer and terracing, had spillover effects on cash crops.   
  Despite  the  fact  that  the  associated  income  effects  of  improved  upland  rice 
technology are relatively large, we find no evidence to indicate that these translate into 
substantial increases in local income inequality.  This is due to the fact that a substantial 
proportion of households in the lower income deciles are technology adopters.  We note 
that this conclusion is broadly consistent with the findings of Lin (1999), despite there   20 
being substantial differences in our studies.  While additional research is called for, this 
provides  some  degree  of  encouragement  that  government  efforts  to  raise  rural, 
agricultural  incomes  are  not  being  undermined  by  the  exacerbation  of  local  income 
disparities.    21 
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TABLE 1 
Summary of Household Characteristics for Low and High Altitude Farmers 
 
 




Number of households  230  243 












Percent of income derived from planting




Percent of income derived from livestock




























Percent of households adopting  improved upland rice technology  65.7  42.0 
   24 
a In addition to upland rice, planting income is derived from: 1) maize and paddy rice (in 
upland areas, not all farm households plant paddy rice due to limited land resources and 
rainfall);  2)  rapeseed  and  buckwheat;  and  3)  perennial  plants  such  as  tea,  rubber, 
sugarcane, and coffee.  
 
b Livestock income is primarily derived from 1)  pigs (which are also raised for self-
consumption), 2) draught animals (in some cases, farm households sell their cattle), and 3) 
chickens and ducks. 
 
c Non-farm income sources primarily include: 1) transfer payments (e.g., government 
Slope Land Conversion Program), and 2) local casual labor work.  
   25 
TABLE 2 
Gini Coefficients of Total Household Income and Income Components 
 







COUNTY 1       
Planting Income (Upland Rice)  0.161  0.446 
0.339 
Planting Income (Other)  0.425  0.498 
Livestock Income  0.367  0.396 
Non–Farm Income  0.046  0.886 
       
COUNTY 2       
Planting Income (Upland Rice)  0.151  0.397 
0.408 
Planting Income (Other)  0.360  0.443 
Livestock Income  0.410  0.459 
Non–Farm Income  0.078  0.877 
       
COUNTY 3       
Planting Income (Upland Rice)  0.083  0.422 
0.291 
Planting Income (Other)  0.781  0.332 
Livestock Income  0.133  0.613 
Non–Farm Income  0.003  0.942 
       
COUNTY 4       
Planting Income (Upland Rice)  0.083  0.302 
0.299 
Planting Income (Other)  0.459  0.336 
Livestock Income  0.420  0.432 
Non–Farm Income  0.038  0.877 
       
COUNTY 5       
Planting Income (Upland Rice)  0.066  0.635 
0.345 
Planting Income (Other)  0.299  0.353 
Livestock Income  0.597  0.463 
Non–Farm Income  0.038  0.818 
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COUNTY 6       
Planting Income (Upland Rice)  0.130  0.381 
0.493 
Planting Income (Other)  0.445  0.683 
Livestock Income  0.291  0.325 
Non–Farm Income  0.133  0.835 
       
COUNTY 7       
Planting Income (Upland Rice)  0.075  0.403 
0.263 
Planting Income (Other)  0.164  0.297 
Livestock Income  0.572  0.305 
Non–Farm Income  0.189  0.657 
       
AGGREGATE       
Planting Income (Upland Rice)  0.142  0.508 
0.382 
Planting Income (Other)  0.389  0.543 
Livestock Income  0.397  0.479 
Non–Farm Income  0.073  0.880 
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TABLE 3 
Changes in the Percentage of Total Cultivated Land Area Devoted to Upland Rice Production over Time 
 
 
  Year  Change from  
2000 to 2004    2000  2002  2004 
Adopting farmers  37.8  36.1  32.1  -15.1% 
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TABLE 4 
The Effect of Upland Rice Technology on Farmers’ Household Incomes 
 










































































































R-squared  0.32  0.46  0.21  0.27  0.20 
Observations  452  405  452  445  157   29 
 
NOTE:    The  dependent  variable  is  the  natural  log  of  income.  Estimated  standard  errors  are  robust  to  heteroscedasticity.    All 
regression specifications include county dummies. 
 
*, **, *** Indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels (two-tailed tests). 
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TABLE 5 



































































































































Extension  0.230002 
(4.24)***  ----  ----  ----  ----  ---- 
R-squared  0.38  ----  ----  ----  ----  ---- 
Observations  452  452  405  452  445  157   31 
 
a The dependent variable in this OLS regression is Adoption. 
 
*, **, *** Indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels (two-tailed tests). 
 
NOTE:  All regression specifications include county dummies.   32 
TABLE 6 
The Effect of Upland Rice Technology on Income Inequality 
 
INCOME SOURCE 










Total Income  0.285  0.288  0.291 
Planting Income  
(Upland Rice) 
0.367  0.376  0.379 
Planting Income  
(Other)  0.494  0.499  0.596 
Livestock Income  0.298  0.301  0.300 
Non-Farm Income  0.381  0.380  0.395 
 
NOTE:    Numbers  in  the  table  are  Gini  coefficients  calculated  for  the  full  sample  of  households.    The 
methodology is described in the text.  Columns (1) and (2) use the OLS coefficients from TABLE 4 to calculate 
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FIGURE 1 
Equilibrium Before the Technology Adoption 
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FIGURE 2 
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FIGURE 3 
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FIGURE 4 
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APPENDIX 
Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
 
Variable
a  Mean  Std. Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Adoption  0.535  0.499  0  1 
Age  41.9  11.1  18  76 
County1  0.338  0.474  0  1 
County2  0.252  0.434  0  1 
County3  0.070  0.255  0  1 
County4  0.063  0.244  0  1 
County5  0.142  0.349  0  1 
County6  0.072  0.259  0  1 
County7  0.063  0.244  0  1 
Education  7.97  1.22  0  12 
Extension  0.816  0.388  0  1 
HHSize  4.68  1.43  1  10 
Income  12,951  10,876  0.82  101,780 
Labor  2.49  1.08  1  7 
Land  25.7  17.5  0  124 
Low Altitude  0.486  0.500  0  1 
Market  11.51  9.95  3  40 
Terrace  0.146  0.172  0  1 
 
a Adoption is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the household is an adopter of 
improved  upland  rice  technology;  Age  and  Education  are  the  age  and  maximum 
educational attainment of the household head (in years); the different County variables   38 
are dummy variables identifying the county in which the household is located; Extension 
is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if there is an agricultural extension program in 
the village; HHSize is the number of persons in the household; Income is the household’s 
annual income in Chinese yuan; Labor is the number of working household members; 
Land measures farm size (in hectares); Low Altitude is a dummy variable taking the value 
1 if the farm is situated at an altitude of 1400 meters or lower; Market is the household’s 
traveling  distance  to  the  nearest  market  (in  kilometers);  and  Terrace  measures  the 
percentage of terraced land. 
 